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This paper develops a structural model to investigate the effects of pharmaceutical price regu-
lation on demand and on manufacturers’price-setting behavior in France. We estimate price-cost
margins in a regulated market with price constraints and infer whether these constraints are
binding. Once the shape of demand is recovered, the identification strategy exploits cost restric-
tions across drugs, which come from observing the same drugs in potentially price-constrained
markets (France) and in markets where prices are unregulated (the US and Germany). Using
data on the anti-ulcer market from 2003 to 2013, we find that some drugs are significantly
constrained by regulation. Counterfactual simulations suggest that price constraints generated
some modest savings (approximately 2% of total expenses) and increased consumer surplus, rel-
ative to a free pricing scenario. These effects come from shifting consumption towards branded
drugs at the expense of generics. However, a policy defining price caps based on prices in other
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Understanding the role played by regulatory constraints is of major importance in, for example, the
pharmaceuticals industry, where regulation is pervasive throughout all stages of drug development
and commercialization, but where countries differ significantly in their regulatory approach. For
instance, manufacturers in the US are allowed to freely choose prices for prescription drugs, while
France regulates the price of pharmaceuticals covered by public health insurance. The French sys-
tem of price regulation was revised in the 2000s, as part of a broader reform intended to control
rising drug expenditures. The regulatory changes targeted both demand and supply, by affecting
the drug choices of prescribers, pharmacists, and patients and the pricing decisions of firms. These
changes include a cap on reimbursement for branded drugs after generic entry and stricter require-
ments on price levels and their evolution over time. Difference-in-difference evidence on the effects
of the price cuts introduced in 2006 suggests that prices declined significantly as a consequence of
this reform, on average by 30% for the drugs subject to this policy.
This paper develops a structural model to investigate the effects of price regulation in France.
We estimate price-cost margins in a regulated market where the regulator imposes price constraints,
and we infer whether these constraints are binding. Once the shape of demand is recovered, the
identification strategy relies on assumptions on the price competition game played by firms and
on cost restrictions across drugs and markets, which exploit the presence of some markets that are
not price constrained, as prices are not regulated. Using IMS data on drug sales, we investigate
whether the current price-setting regulation in France imposed binding constraints on the prices of
anti-ulcer drugs between 2003 and 2013, using the US and Germany as unconstrained markets. We
then evaluate the counterfactual free pricing equilibrium in which all price regulation is removed
and a different, regulated equilibrium based on external reference pricing, a policy that was recently
implemented in France. These comparisons allow us to quantify changes in prices, demand, and
spending due to price regulation.
Estimating demand is the first step of our analysis and requires a flexible yet tractable model
able to capture the differentiation of anti-ulcer drugs, as well as the heterogeneity in preferences
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(Ching, 2010a and 2010b). Following the standard approach in empirical IO (Berry, 1994; Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2000 and 2001) and some recent applications to pharmaceuticals
(Björnerstedt and Verboven, 2016, Dunn, 2012), we use a random coeffi cient logit model to account
for heterogeneity in preferences over drug characteristics and price disutilities. Our demand spec-
ification controls for quality, by including quality-related drug characteristics, and for advertising
(primarily in the form of detailing, the practice of sending pharmaceutical sales representatives
to physicians). We find that demand for anti-ulcer drugs is price elastic, particularly for drugs
subject to the maximum reimbursement rule in France. Even after controlling for detailing, which
positively affects sales, brand-name drugs are preferred to generics, although there is significant es-
timated variation in preferences. Consistent with medical knowledge, we find that anti-ulcer drugs
are highly differentiated and that substitution occurs mostly (but not entirely) at the level of the
molecule or subclass.
Once we have identified demand and substitution patterns, we explore the impact of regulation
on prices and margins, in a setting where firms strategically choose prices given the constraints
imposed by the regulator, which amount to price caps. The magnitude of these price ceilings
imposed on firms is unknown to the econometrician, but our identification strategy allows us to
infer when price constraints are binding across drugs and periods. Under the assumption that firms
compete à la Bertrand, the identification is obtained by the use of unconstrained markets (the US
and Germany, where drug prices are not regulated) and by restrictions on the costs of drugs across
markets, which allow us to recover such constraints.
We find that some but not all drugs are significantly constrained and that regulation has
spillover effects on drugs not directly subject to price cuts, as prices chosen by manufacturers
are affected by the regulatory constraints on their closest substitutes through the equilibrium con-
ditions. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the current price controls reduced prices relative
to a free pricing scenario, especially in years in which prices were cut. Such declines in prices, espe-
cially for high-quality drugs, shifted consumption towards branded drugs at the expense of generics,
which experienced a smaller decrease in price, in both absolute and percentage terms. Once the
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difference between the branded and the generic price is reduced, the preference for the branded
drug (captured by our demand estimates) leads to substantial losses for generic manufacturers, as
profits would be 23% higher in a free pricing scenario, compared to an increase of only 15% for
branded firms. Nevertheless, price constraints generate some modest savings, approximately 2%
of total expenses, on average, over the 11 years of data and increase consumer surplus, due to the
greater utilization of cheaper and preferred branded drugs. To avoid the increased consumption
of branded drugs in favor of generics, the regulator could instead cap prices at the level of other
countries (so-called external reference pricing), a rule introduced in France for other drugs in 2004.
Our simulations suggest that under this policy, prices would decline even more and demand would
increase but less than proportionally, leading to additional savings. Contrary to the regulation
in place for anti-ulcer drugs during the period 2003-2013, generic penetration would increase (one
of the objectives of the French regulator), due to the significant reductions of generic prices and
margins. However, while in the short run consumer surplus would be higher than under the current
regulatory setting, this alternative regulation may hinder the survival of generics in the long run.
Our work contributes to different strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the broad
research on demand for pharmaceuticals, which has employed different approaches to estimate
preferences for drugs and substitution patterns, from log-log models (as in Berndt et al., 1996;
Berndt, Kyle and Ling, 2003; Rizzo, 1999), to AIDS and multi-stage budgeting (as in Ellison,
Cockburn, Griliches and Hausman, 1997, and Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia, 2006). Our approach
more closely resembles the works that use discrete choice models (logit in Azoulay (2002), Berndt,
Pindyck and Azoulay (2003), and Crawford and Shum (2005) and nested logit in Donohue and
Berndt (2004), Stern (1996), and Arcidiacono, Ellickson, Landry and Ridley (2013)). Our random
coeffi cient logit model is similar to Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016) and Ching (2010a and 2010b),
as we explicitly account for heterogeneity in price sensitivity, although we do not incorporate
consumer learning.
Our study explores the role of price controls and shows their different effects on branded and
generic drugs, in line with previous works documenting how price controls may render generic
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competition ineffective or even counterproductive (Danzon and Chao, 2000). Our results suggest
that external reference pricing may avoid this effect in France in the short run, although similar
policies linking prices across countries have been shown to discourage or delay drug introduction
(Kyle, 2007; Danzon, Wang, and Wang, 2005; Danzon and Epstein, 2008) and to affect drug
entry decisions beyond the role of market size and firm characteristics (Scott-Morton, 1999; Kyle,
2006), leading to large welfare losses at a global scale (Filson, 2012). Nevertheless, price controls
may be welfare-improving when used to counterbalance the welfare losses from other regulatory
measures (see Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2006) on TRIPS product patents in India). However,
alternative regulations may dominate price controls. For example, policies that impose additional
copayments on patients demanding high-priced branded drugs can be more effective than price caps
in lowering drug prices and provide incentives for pharmacists to promote generic sales (see Brekke,
Grasdal and Holmås, 2009; Brekke, Holmås and Straume, 2011 and 2013, on Norway).
Our work also illustrates how standard IO methods can be combined with cost restrictions
across markets to recover the price-cost margins in a setting where firms may be constrained by
regulation but where these constraints are unobserved by the econometrician. In a similar vein,
Goldberg (1995) studies the car industry and the role of trade policy, such as voluntary export
restraints, that imposed a quota on Japanese cars in the US market in the 1980s. The Lagrange
multipliers associated with the quantity constraints on imported cars are identified by exploiting
observations from the truck market, which was not subject to the same quota constraints. In
Goldberg (1995), quantity constraints are observed, while we do not observe the implicit price caps
that the regulator imposes on firms. Salvo (2010) addresses a similar problem in estimating market
power in the Brazilian cement industry, where firms are constrained in price setting due to the
threat of entry by foreign producers, which poses an observable ceiling for the price that domestic
competitors can set. Salvo (2010) predicts the price ceiling based on observed costs. Brenkers
and Verboven (2006) study how constraints on international markup differentials introduced after
liberalizing the distribution of cars in Europe affect the market equilibrium. After estimating the
demand for cars before liberalization and thus without price constraints, they simulate a new price
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equilibrium by imposing a given maximum difference in markups across countries. We use the
variation across countries and markets to generate the cost restrictions needed for identification.
Our identification strategy could be used in the context of markets where prices may be affected
by inequality constraints on markups across markets. A recent paper by Ching, Hayashi and
Wang (2015) explores the role of capacity constraints and excess demand in the nursing home
market. Their identification strategy relies on observing the unconstrained demand of private-pay
consumers (who never face capacity constraints because they are given priority) to identify the
extent of excess demand due to Medicaid patients and test whether the constraints bind. Hence,
they use demand-side variation, while we exploit cost restrictions across markets.
In the following, Section 2 describes the market for anti-ulcer drugs and the data used; it also
illustrates how price regulation operates in France and provides difference-in-difference evidence
of its impact on prices. Section 3 presents our identification of price-cost margins in an oligopoly
model when demand is known, provided that both constrained and unconstrained markets are
observed. Thereafter, Section 4 explains the particular demand model estimated as a first step of
the supply-side estimation. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 reports counterfactual
price equilibrium and savings calculations in the absence of the price setting regulation in France
(Section 6.1) or with external reference pricing (Section 6.2). Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Market, Data, Regulation and Difference-in-Difference Evidence
2.1 Regulatory Framework in France
The consumption of pharmaceuticals in France has historically been high, due to low regulated
prices relative to other comparable European markets (Nguyen-Kim, Oz, Paris and Sermet, 2005),
a generous public drug reimbursement system, covering nearly the entire French population, and
high rates of complementary health insurance. In the early 2000s, pharmaceutical expenses in
France represented one-fifth of total public expenditures on health and doubled with respect to
the previous decade (reaching 30 billion euros in 2004), increasing more rapidly than anywhere
else in Europe (Nguyen-Kim et al., 2005). This situation accelerated a project to reform the
pharmaceutical regulatory system intended to reduce public expenditures on drugs. The policies
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introduced targeted both the demand and the supply of drugs, ranging from public campaigns to
encourage the use of generics, to financial incentives for generic substitution to pharmacists (see
additional details in Section 4.1), to new guidelines for physicians to prescribe primarily drugs for
which generic alternatives are available, and to a thorough review of the list of reimbursed drugs
that reduced or removed completely public coverage for those with insuffi cient therapeutic value.
Major changes were made to the rules that govern drug reimbursement. In 2003, a maximum
reimbursement price was introduced (“TFR”for Tarif Forfaitaire de Responsabilité) when generic
penetration does not reach a certain threshold defined by the Ministry of Health. In such a case,
coverage for these drugs is only up to the TFR price, which is a function of generic prices1. Man-
ufacturers can keep the price above this TFR price, but the difference is paid out of pocket by the
patient.
The reform also addressed the process of price setting, which in France is regulated by the
Economic Committee for Health Products (CEPS, Comité Economique des Produits de Santé).
The price proposed by companies must be approved by the regulator, and it depends on the
therapeutic improvement of the drug, on the anticipated sales volume, and on the price of existing
comparable reimbursed drugs (further details on price setting are reported in Section 3.2). In 2004,
the criterion that prices of new drugs need to be in line with prices in Italy, Germany, the UK and
Spain was added (so-called external referencing). In 2006, the CEPS declared a price cut on all
drugs based on the same molecule when generics become available or when they have been on the
market for at least 24 months. The rule for price cuts has evolved over time (both in terms of the
percentage of the price to be cut and time since generic entry) but can still be applied to markets
not subject to TFR (TFR and price cuts being mutually exclusive).
Table 1 summarizes the regulatory changes that affected both the demand and the supply side
of the anti-ulcer drug market in France between 2003 and 2013. Our work focuses on the impact of
1The regulator decides which molecules are subject to TFR based on the rate of generic penetration. In general,
TFR can be introduced when the market share of generics for a molecule is below 60% after 18 months or 65% after
2 years since generic entry. These percentages and timing have changed slightly over time and unexpectedly, and the
regulator has total power over this issue, meaning that it can make exceptions and unilaterally decide to define a
TFR.
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price cuts (which directly affect 6 drugs in our sample since 2006), accounting for the role of TFR in
demand. We will then explore the effect of external referencing in our counterfactual simulations.
Table 1: Regulatory Changes Affecting the Anti-ulcer Market in France since 2003
Regulatory changes affecting the demand side
Date Description
September 2003 Introduction of maximum reimbursement price (TFR) for Cimetidine
(Tagamet) and Ranitidine (Zantac and Raniplex)
January 2006 Introduction of TFR on Famotidine (Pepcidine)
Regulatory changes affecting the supply side
Date Description
January 2006 Price cut of all drugs in a class if generics entered or have been available
for 24 months —Omeprazole (Losec) and Lansoprazole (Takepron, Lanzor)
January 2008 Price cut for branded drugs if enough sales of generics of the same
or close substitute molecules —Esomeprazole (Nexium)
January 2009 Revision of the price cut rule (18 months instead of 24)
for Omeprazole, Lansoprazole, and Pantoprazole (Pantozol)
January 2012 Revision of the price cut rule at generic entry for
Omeprazole, Lansoprazole, Pantoprazole, and Rabeprazole (Pariet)
Note: Price cuts in 2006, 2009, 2012 are of different percentages.
2.2 The Anti-ulcer Drugs Market
We define the anti-ulcer prescription drugs market using the A02B category of the international
WHO ATC classification. The absence of real substitutes for these drugs (hospitalization and
surgery target different conditions) make the market easily identifiable in the A02B class, without
having to include drugs from other therapeutic classes among competitors (Crawford and Shum,
2005). The market comprises three subclasses that can be regarded as three different generations
of drugs treating ulcer and ulcer-related conditions. The subclass of histamine antagonists (H2)
includes anti-ulcer treatments of the first generation, introduced in the 1970s and 1980s, which treat
ulcer symptoms by blocking the action of histamine in the stomach. H2 drugs are based on a number
of molecules, the most common of which are Cimetidine (brand name: Tagamet), Famotidine
(brand name: Pepcidine), Ranitidine (brand names: Zantac and Raniplex) and Nizatidine (brand
name: Panaxid). H2 had considerable success in many countries, driven by SmithKline’s Tagamet
(Cimetidine) and Glaxo’s Zantac (Ranitidine); they remained top sellers until the late 1980s, when a
new generation of ulcer treatments was introduced, the proton-pump inhibitors (PPI). These drugs,
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instead of blocking the reception of histamine, act at the source of acid secretion, inhibiting it for
a longer time, and are considered superior to H2 and other existing drugs. This subclass includes
several derivatives of benzimidazole: Omeprazole (brand name: Losec, the world’s top-selling drug
for several years), Esomeprazole (brand name: Nexium), Lansoprazole (brand names: Lanzor and
Takepron), Pantoprazole (brand name: Pantozol), and Rabeprazole (brand name: Pariet). Finally,
the third subclass is a residual category, which includes Prostaglandins, which are used primarily
for the prevention and treatment of peptic ulcer in the elderly (Misoprostol, brand name: Cytotec).
The anti-ulcer market has long been one of the top-selling therapeutic classes worldwide (being
the leader from 1990 to 2003). This was driven by the presence of blockbusters and competition
based on subsequent innovations. Anti-ulcer drugs are manufactured by several of the most impor-
tant pharmaceutical players: AstraZeneca (Losec and Nexium), GlaxoSmithKline (Zantac), Takeda
(Takepron and Pantozol), Pfizer (Cytotec), Sanofi (Lanzor), Johnson&Johnson (Pariet), Merck
(Pepcidine), Abbott (Raniplex), Aptalis (Tagamet), Norgine (Panaxid), and Forest (Pylera). In
addition, the market experienced patent expiration for major drugs in the early 2000s, and several
entry waves of generics started populating the French market.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from IMS Health covering all wholesale transactions in the retail and hospital sector
(revenues and quantities sold for each drug in a country-year) for the period 2003-2013. We also
use advertising data from IMS Health Global Promotional Track for France, Germany and the US
(IMS Health —Base Global Promo Track - [2001 - 2014]). We have data on advertising expenditures
for each drug by media at the country level for France, Germany and the US. Descriptive statistics
on advertising by market are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A.4 and report the yearly average
of total advertising expenditures for branded drugs or generics by country and the part of this
advertising that corresponds to detailing expenses. In France, most expenses are in the form of
detailing, with the rest being in journal publications, meetings, and other. Advertising of generics is
also much lower than for branded drugs, and this is also true in the US but not in Germany, where
the ratio of advertising expenses over total revenue is much higher for generics than in France or the
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US. We also observe the number of detailing units,2 which will be useful for computing an average
price per detailing unit in each year and country. In the quantity sales data, a drug-country-year
triplet observation is uniquely identified by the name of the drug, its manufacturer, its molecule,
its therapeutic form, and its brand type (originator, licensed or generic drug). We compute an
average wholesale price per standard unit from the figures on quantities (where standard units
are defined as the smallest unit of the drug standardized across dosage and therapeutic form) and
revenues per year (in constant $US). The data were aggregated at the therapeutic form level to
avoid distinguishing the different methods of administration of exactly the same drug (tablet and
effervescent capsules, for instance). We use these IMS data for both quantities and revenues for
France, Germany and the US, but we also use the average wholesale prices in Italy, Spain and the
UK as instrumental variables (see Section 5 below). We also use data from the French regulatory
agency HAS (available at www.theriaque.org) to gather additional information on the indications
and side effects of each drug, the medical benefit indices (SMR and ASMR3) for each indication (a
rating used recently by Kyle and Williams, 2017), and the date of introduction and level of TFR.
Between 2003 and 2013, a total of 103 different drugs were sold in France by 29 different com-
panies: among them, 13 are branded firms, and the remaining 16 are generic manufacturers. The
majority of the drugs (77) belong to the PPI subclass (A02B-C), which represents the bulk of sales,
followed by H2 (A02B-A), with 24 products; Prostaglandins (A02B-B) are present with only one
drug (Pfizer’s Cytotec); and a combination of an anti-ulcer and antibiotic drug completes the list.
French anti-ulcer drugs in this period are based on 11 active ingredients: five PPI (Omeprazole,
Esomeprazole, Lansoprazole, Pantoprazole and Rabeprazole), four H2 (Cimetidine, Famotidine,
Nizatidine and Ranitidine), one Prostaglandin (Misoprostol) and one combination (Bismuth and
2Detailing corresponds to promotional activity by pharmaceutical sales representatives to physicians. They are
defined in the data as a direct contact between physicians and the pharmaceutical company, whether a visit or
telephone call from a sales representative, e-details or live videoconferencing. Detailing units are defined as the
number of brand presentations to a physician over the period, aggregated at the country level, and the detailing
cost corresponds to how much it would cost for a sales representative to visit (in person or via phone) a physician,
including not only her salary and benefits but also travel cost, gas, and maintenance by the minute.
3SMR (service médical rendu/actual benefit) is an absolute rating of drug importance, and ASMR (amélioration
du service médical rendu/improvement in actual benefit) is a relative rating of therapeutic value compared to existing
treatments.
10
antibiotic). For eight of these, generics were or became available during the sample period: Miso-
prostol, Nizatidine, and the combination drug were sold only as brand names. In Germany and the
US, the number of drugs is higher than in France, and all drugs sold in France are always sold in
these two other countries.
The therapeutic benefit of these drugs was classified as important by the CEPS for most of the
years in the sample, granting a 65% reimbursement rate, except for some older H2 drugs, the reim-
bursement for which has been reduced to 35% since 2007. The therapeutic improvement vis à vis
existing drugs was considered insuffi cient (ASMR level 5 on a 1-5 scale), except for AstraZeneca’s
Losec (Omeprazole) and Nexium (Esomeprazole). Additional measures of drug quality, beyond
ASMR, are the number of therapeutic forms (between 1 and 4 in the data), indications and side
effects. A higher number of therapeutic forms makes it possible to better suit the needs of het-
erogeneous patients. Generic drugs offer at most two different forms. The number of indications
and side effects differs significantly across drugs, from a minimum of two to a maximum of nine
indications (Losec and Nexium) and eight side effects (Nexium’s peculiarity).
Table 2: Summary Statistics for France
Number of Quantity Market Share Wholesale Firm
drugs Price/std unit Revenue
Year All Branded Generics (1 ,000 std units) Branded Generics ($US) (€) (1 ,000 $US)
2003 25 12 13 1 131 140 98% 2% 0.75 0.55 1 414 127
2004 39 12 27 1 233 735 86% 14% 0.78 0.57 1 455 683
2005 40 12 28 1 334 331 77% 23% 0.70 0.51 1 423 278
2006 42 12 30 1 444 926 73% 27% 0.63 0.46 1 404 320
2007 51 12 39 1 508 936 70% 30% 0.60 0.44 1 364 369
2008 49 12 37 1 535 426 61% 39% 0.56 0.41 1 240 799
2009 59 12 47 1 596 513 55% 45% 0.52 0.38 1 183 251
2010 62 12 50 1 669 252 50% 50% 0.46 0.33 1 069 219
2011 74 12 62 1 732 595 39% 61% 0.43 0.31 974 594
2012 86 12 74 1 820 351 29% 71% 0.39 0.28 853 985
2013 94 11 83 1 890 575 18% 82% 0.32 0.23 619 035
Notes: P rice is the average price p er standard unit in $US or in € (constant exchange rate for 2014Q2: €/$US=1.3772).
Exp enses is the total m anufacturer-level revenue of the class. W holesa le prices are at the manufacturer level.
Here, the market shares are relative to the total sa les of anti-u lcer drugs (no outside good as in the model).
Table 2 shows that there is a steady and significant increase in the number of drugs marketed,
from 25 in 2003 to 94 in 2013, due to the entry of generics, the market share of which rose signifi-
cantly during the period. In the early 2000s, several Ranitidine- and Cimetidine-equivalents entered
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the market (Zantac and Tagamet lost patent protection in the 1990s), but generics still represented
a residual category in terms of volumes and revenues. In 2004, a second entry wave took place in
the form of generics of the world’s top-selling drug, Losec (AstraZeneca’s Omeprazole), followed by
many others at the patent expiration of other PPI molecules during the later years of the sample
period. By 2011, generic sales constituted more than half of the class volume, representing the
vast majority at the end of the sample period. These figures are similar in Germany and the US,
with the former reaching even higher levels of generic penetration (see Tables A2 and A3 in Ap-
pendix A.4). Interestingly, in France, the market for anti-ulcer drugs expanded at the same time as
generic penetration, meaning that the sales of branded versions did not decline dramatically. Actu-
ally, aggregate quantity increased by approximately 50% during the period. However, revenues also
declined, leading to a decreasing average price per standard unit, in line with generics being cheaper
(the price of generics is capped at a fixed percentage of the price of their brand-name counterpart)
and to the increased pressure imposed by the reform on the regulated prices of brand-name drugs.
2.4 Difference-in-Difference Evidence of the Effect of Regulation on Prices
As reported in Table 1, there are several regulatory changes that may affect demand or supply for
anti-ulcer drugs in France during the period of study. In specific, the regulator introduced price cuts
on branded drugs since 2006. Furthermore, reimbursement rules changed over time and affected
some drugs with a maximum reimbursement price through the TFR rule explained above. Before
showing how one can structurally identify and estimate the impact of these regulations on prices,
demand, and expenditures, we provide difference-in-difference evidence on the effects of these events
on prices. The main focus of our structural model will be to quantify the effects of price regulation
and in particular the price cuts imposed since 2006. These cuts affect the price of the brand-
name drugs after generic entry or when generics have been on the market for at least 24 months,
whether they are based on the same molecule or on different ones considered close substitutes.
The drugs subject to these cuts belong to the PPI category and include Losec (Omeprazole),
Lanzor and Takepron (Lansoprazole) since late 2006, Nexium (Esomeprazole) since 2008, Pantozol
(Pantoprazole) since 2009, and Pariet (Rabeprazole) since 2012. Moreover, H2 anti-ulcer drugs were
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affected by the introduction of the TFR. This rule, which imposes a maximum reimbursement price,
was introduced at the end of 2003 and caps the reimbursement level of branded drugs and their
generics. In 2004 and 2005, three anti-ulcer drugs were subject to this rule: Tagamet (Cimetidine),
Zantac and Raniplex (Ranitidine); a fourth was added in 2006, Pepcidine (Famotidine). Although
TFR is not the main object of our analysis, as it is a policy affecting demand and not supply directly,
our structural model will address the role of the TFR rule on demand. Previous studies have shown
that policies that impose additional copayments on patients demanding high-priced branded drugs
(similar to the French TFR rule) may result in lower drug prices (see Brekke, Grasdal and Holmås,
2009; Brekke, Holmås and Straume, 2011 and 2013, on Norway). For this reason, we believe that
it is important to control for TFR in the difference-in-difference analysis, to rule out the possibility
that the drugs subject to TFR are different from other drugs within the anti-ulcer market.
Using the data from France, Germany and the US, we test the effects of both price cuts and
TFR on the prices of drugs using triple difference regressions within this class and across markets.
To do this, we define the group of drugs denoted “TFR”as those drugs that have been subject to
the maximum reimbursement price rule in France since 2004, and we denote by “Price Cut” the
dummy variable for the group of drugs subject to that rule in France (the two rules are mutually
exclusive). Of course, these two rules are supposed to have affected the price of drugs in France
only and not in Germany and the US, but these drugs could also be different from other drugs
within the anti-ulcer market, hence the use of interaction with country dummies.
Table 3 reports the results of the regression of the log price of drugs on drug characteristics, on
the drug group dummies “TFR”and “Price Cut”, on the interaction between these group dummies
and the dummy for whether the time period is after the regulatory event (i.e., when the TFR or price
cut was introduced for each affected drug), and on the interaction between the dummy variable
for France after the start of the regulatory event and these group dummies. The coeffi cients of
these last interactions can be interpreted as the effects of the regulatory event in France on prices.
In column (1), by adding country fixed effects, molecule fixed effects, and year fixed effects, we
find that the drugs in the “Price Cut” and “TFR”groups are slightly more expensive (although
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the effect is not significant) and that their prices have increased slightly (albeit not significantly).
However, the interaction of each group dummy with the regulatory period dummy “After” and
the interaction with the French dummy shows that in France these drugs became cheaper when
each of these regulations was implemented. The effect is significant for both “Price Cut” and
“TFR”(except for the last two specifications for “Price Cut”). When using different country and
year fixed effects or country and molecule fixed effects in columns (2), (3) and (4), the results
are similar, but the significance is weaker in the fourth specification. Note that in column (4),
we have country-molecule-year fixed effects, meaning that the effects of drug characteristics and
regulation are identified from variations within a molecule-country-year triplet. Table 3 also shows
that branded drugs and those with an indication for the eradication of helicobacter pylori are more
expensive, whereas drugs with more side effects are cheaper (the results are similar with price as
the dependent variable).
This difference-in-difference evidence seems to confirm that these regulatory events did reduce
prices; however, this is conditional on counterfactual prices having been similar. It is indeed possible
that demand changed during these years due to country-specific changes, leading to lower prices,
or that specific cost shocks also affected the equilibrium pricing. A structural estimation will allow
us to interpret those results and test whether regulation actually constrained prices or whether
observed price changes are simply due to demand or supply conditions. Moreover, our structural
approach will allow us to perform simulations of counterfactual policies.
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Table 3: Triple Difference Regression of Log Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Log Price Log Price Log Price Log Price
Drug Characteristics
Branded 1.648*** 1.667*** 1.824*** 2.023***
(0.484) (0.507) (0.501) (0.597)
Nb. Side Effects -0.352*** -0.349*** -0.341*** -0.285***
(0.0957) (0.103) (0.0855) (0.0350)
Formats 0.131 0.123 0.0345 0.0172
(0.166) (0.174) (0.175) (0.199)
Helicobacter Indication 3.199*** 3.192*** 2.821*** 1.790**
(0.960) (1.062) (0.197) (0.679)
NSAID Indication -0.642 -0.477 1.227*** -3.531***
(0.440) (0.483) (0.356) (0.645)
Drug Group Dummies
Group “TFR” 0.158 0.198 -0.183 -0.0559
(0.364) (0.421) (0.444) (0.425)
Group “Price Cut” 0.166 0.0600 -0.299 -0.750**
(0.280) (0.290) (0.295) (0.321)
Drug Group Dummies * After
“TFR”* After 0.341 0.324 0.639 0.468
(0.558) (0.622) (0.690) (0.724)
“Price Cut”* After 0.232 0.290 0.113 0.659*
(0.233) (0.188) (0.186) (0.354)
Reimbursement Rule Change in France
“TFR”* After * France -0.770 -0.814 -1.656** -1.627**
(0.541) (0.542) (0.694) (0.772)
Price Regulation in France
“Price Cut”* After * France -0.773** -0.737** -0.293 -0.328
(0.353) (0.338) (0.291) (0.384)
Country Fixed Effects Yes
Molecule Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Country*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Country*Molecule Fixed Effects Yes
Country*Molecule*Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614
R-squared 0.507 0.525 0.599 0.670
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by country-molecu le. * , **, and *** ind icate sign ificance at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels.
D ep endent variab le is price in $US. Data for France, G ermany, and the US from 2003 to 2013.
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3 Supply Model and Identification of Margins
Assuming that the shape of demand for pharmaceuticals is known, we first present our model of
the effect of regulation on the supply side and defer the modeling and estimation of demand to the
next section.
We focus on pricing with an exogenously given market structure, taking entry decisions as
exogenous. Pharmaceutical innovation involves long R&D delays, decided many years in advance,
and generic entry is constrained by patent protection. Kyle (2007), Danzon et al. (2005), and
Danzon and Epstein (2008) have shown that delays in entry can be strategic, but we leave to future
research the modeling of pricing and regulation in a fully dynamic setting. Moreover, all but one
entry in our data are due to generics, and thus, they will not be affected by anticipation in the
pricing decisions for branded drugs.
In France, the prices of drugs must be agreed upon by the regulator (CEPS) and are not de-
termined under fully binding regulatory rules. Thus, it is possible that pharmaceutical companies
obtain prices that maximize profits. Indeed, lobbying and negotiations between the regulator and
companies may lead to a price equilibrium not far from profit maximization equilibria (Grandfils,
2008): it is known that the price approved by the regulator is often that proposed by the manufac-
turer in the first place through a procedure called “dépôt de prix” (Grandfils and Sermet, 2006).
This seems to signal that, despite regulation, the price remains a decision made primarily by the
company.
We first present the notations and the standard case of price competition without price regula-
tion, and then our model with price constraints is introduced with a brief discussion of the analogy
with Nash bargaining models.
3.1 Equilibrium without Price Regulation
In the case of free price setting, which is the most relevant model for the US and Germany but
could also be the equilibrium outcome for France, it is well known how profit-maximizing prices
should be set and how marginal costs can be identified if the shape of demand is known and a
model of firm behavior is assumed (BLP, 1995; Nevo, 2001).
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Denote by Πft the variable profit of multi-product firm f in market t, where a market will be
defined as a country-year. As fixed costs and other R&D costs are not affecting pricing decisions,




(pjt − cjt) qjt(pt,at)− ajt
where pjt is the price of drug j, ajt is the detailing expense for drug j, cjt is the constant marginal
cost of product j, and qjt(pt,at) is the quantity of drug j demanded given the vector pt of all drug
prices and the vector of detailing expenditures at for all J products.
As assumptions on firms’detailing choices are not necessary to identify marginal costs, we only
consider the firms’profit-maximizing conditions in prices and assume that they compete in price à
la Bertrand. Assuming that a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices exists, the price








Then, with 1{j∈Ff} = 1 if j ∈ Ff and 0 otherwise, denoting by Df the J×J diagonal matrix whose




qt = (q1t, ., qJt)
′, ct = (c1t, ., cJt)
′, we obtain the usual formula valid for all firms f :
Df (pt − ct) = − [DfQptDf ]−1Dfqt (1)
Thus, given demand estimates and the observation of prices, one can obtain price-cost margins
per product and per year by solving the system of first-order conditions obtained above. This is
the usual identification result of price-cost margins4.
An alternative strategy to identify the marginal costs of drugs is to use the long-term price
equilibrium of drugs after the entry of generics under the assumption that margins are almost zero
for those drugs. In this case, the marginal cost of a molecule can be thought of as the lowest price
of its generic version (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). This approach is very robust in cases in which
4Remark that if advertising is optimally chosen jointly with prices, first-order conditions in advertising lead to a
full set of constraints between the matrix of advertising elasticities of demand, that of the price elasticity of demand
and the ratio of advertising expenditures to revenue. However, using only the optimal pricing strategy allows us to
identify marginal costs and is robust to the modeling of the supply side determination of advertising.
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marginal costs are “constant”over time, as it does not rely on any demand specification, and when
the lowest price of generics by molecule has converged, which does not seem to be the case for
anti-ulcer molecules, where some generics have entered only recently.
3.2 Price-Constrained Equilibrium
Let us now consider the effects of price regulation on the pricing equilibrium. In France, regulation
amounts to imposing some price ceiling on branded or generic drugs, either because of explicit
constraints on prices (as in the case of the price cut rules in place after 2006) or because of implicit
constraints imposed by the regulator to the industry. For simplicity, we consider a market t (which
can represent a country and year) in which firms are potentially price constrained such that each
price pjt must belong to a set Ωjt.
For branded drugs in France, some price ceiling pjt for drug j may be imposed by the regulator
when the drug is first authorized and revised over time, in which case Ωjt = [0, pjt]. For generic
drugs, French regulation also imposes a price ceiling that is a specific proportion of the price of the
branded version. If for a generic drug j we denote by b(j) the index of the branded version of the
same molecule, the price constraint can then be written as pjt ≤ τ b(j)tpb(j)t, where τ b(j)t is a year-
specific (and sometimes molecule-specific) factor set by the regulator; then, Ωjt = [0, τ b(j)tpb(j)t].
Until 2005, it was 55% at the time of generic entry, then reduced to 50% in 2006, 45% in 2009, and
40% in 2012. This percentage may be higher in exceptional cases approved by the regulator (high
production costs, late entry for generic manufacturers, low price of the branded drug) but reducing
to less than 10% the difference between the brand-name and the generic price.
Then, removing detailing arguments (at) from demand to simplify notation, firm f’s constrained






(pjt − cjt) qjt(pt) s.t. pjt ∈ Ωjt
18
Assuming that a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices exists, the necessary first-order







= λjt ∀j ∈ Ff , ∀f
In the current regulatory framework in France, denoting by λ̃jt the Lagrange multiplier of the price
cap constraint that may implicitly or explicitly be imposed by the regulator on branded drugs
(pjt ≤ pjt) and on generic drugs (pjt ≤ τ b(j)tpb(j)t), λjt is equal to the “true”Lagrange multiplier
λ̃jt, except in the case in which the manufacturer owns both the branded and generic drug version,
in which case for the branded drug j, λjt = λ̃jt − τ jtλ̃g(j), where g(j) denotes the generic version
of j6.
Before studying under which conditions one can identify marginal costs in this model of Bertrand-
Nash competition with price constraints, it is interesting to compare this modeling to Nash bar-
gaining. Our modeling reflects the French regulatory system, where firms propose prices through
a procedure called “dépôt de prix”that the regulator accepts or rejects. However, our constrained
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium can be identical to a Nash-in-Nash bargaining equilibrium in some cases.
For example, if the regulatory objective is a function Wt(pt) of prices (for example a consumer wel-
fare measure), and if θjt is the bargaining parameter of the firm for drug j at t, assuming simple
drug-by-drug bargaining for each firm, a Nash-in-Nash bargaining equilibrium in price would imply
















where ∆fWt(pt) is the change in consumer welfare obtained by agreeing on the price pjt with
firm f . This first-order condition shows that there is always a bargaining parameter θjt ∈ [0, 1]
such that 1−θjtθjt Πft(pt)
∂ ln ∆fWt(pt)
∂pjt
= λjt since λjt ≥ 0, implying that the constrained Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium can be seen as the solution of a Nash-in-Nash bargaining model. If we impose
5This is always possible provided that there exist Nj functions Ψnjt such that pjt ∈ Ωjt ⇔ Ψnjt (pt, ct,qt) ≤ 0 for








kt (pt, ct,qt) /∂pjt,
where Λnkt is the Lagrange multiplier of the price constraint Ψ
n
jt (pt, ct,qt) ≤ 0.
6This is the case only for the manufacturer (Sanofi) owning the branded drug Lanzor and several generic versions.
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constraints on the bargaining parameters θjt, for example to be identical across the products of
a given firm, the bargaining model then imposes restrictions on the equilibrium prices. These
restrictions will be more or less desirable depending on whether the bargaining model is a good
approximation of the real world. One interesting difference is that a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
with price caps allows ∂Πft(pt)∂pjt to be zero when pjt is lower than the price cap, while a Nash
bargaining model with a firm-level bargaining parameter θjt = θft ∈]0, 1[ implies that it is always
strictly positive.
3.3 Identification of Marginal Costs under Constrained Equilibrium in Prices
In the case of a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices, the first-order conditions of firm f can be
written in matrix form as
Df (pt − ct) = − [DfQp (pt)Df ]−1Df (qt − λt)
where the elements of λt = (λ1t, .., λJt) are unknown (Jt allows the total number of products to
vary with t).
Thus, with λt being unknown, even with known demand and prices, one cannot identify price-
cost margins without further assumptions. Theoretically, the net effects of regulation on prices are
ambiguous and will depend on all own- and cross-price elasticities of demand. A price reduction
for one drug can affect other drugs that are not constrained because of cross-price elasticities of
demand. Using first-order conditions, for each vector λt, we have price-cost margins or marginal
cost cjt (λt) as a known function of λt (depending on demand and prices). Using the super-script f
for the vector in which the elements corresponding to products not belonging to firm f are replaced
by zeros, the first-order conditions can also be written as
cft (λ
f





−1 (qft − λ
f
t ) (2)
Thus, we cannot identify marginal costs without restrictions on λft . Moreover, price constraints
have spillover effects across drugs because the marginal cost of product i of firm f depends on the











for i, j ∈ Ff
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where [.]i,j stands for the row i, column j term of the matrix in the brackets.
However, adding some cost restrictions may allow identification. Our approach is similar to
that of Goldberg (1995), who uses observations not subject to quotas in the car market to identify
the effect of quantity constraints on exports.
Let us first assume that some unconstrained markets S are observed, such that
λt = 0 for any t ∈ S (3)
If we add the very simple cost restriction that the marginal costs of drugs should be the same across
markets, whether price constrained or not, then we can easily identify the costs of drugs using only
observations from unconstrained markets, provided that the drugs in constrained markets are also
present and observed in other markets in which prices are freely chosen by firms. Assuming such
cost equality across markets is of course too strong, but a similar idea can be applied and used
for identification with more flexible cost restrictions across markets. We thus assume that for any
t ∈ S, there exists a vector of observed variables z such that, for all t0 /∈ S, the marginal costs
satisfy for all j:
cjt − cjt0 = (zjt − zjt0)
′ δ + ωjt with E (ωjt|zjt − zjt0) = 0 (4)
This assumption means that cost differences between markets in S and other markets satisfy the
cost restriction above, such that the difference in costs across markets depends linearly on a set
of observable differences zjt− zjt0 and on unobserved, market-specific, additive, mean-independent
shocks ωjt.
Then, we can state the following proposition that allows us to identify the marginal costs for
potentially constrained markets (see the proof in Appendix A.1):
Proposition: With assumptions (3) and (4) and a market t0 /∈ S, marginal costs ct0 are




where λt0 is identified using the following moment condition:
E (ωt (δ,λt0)) = 0 (5)
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with vector ωt (δ,λt0) defined by
ωt (δ,λt0) =
[




−1λt0 − (zt − zt0)
′ δ
provided that the matrix E[(zt − zt0)
′ , Qp(pt0)
−1] has full rank.
The proposition shows that identification is obtained when all prices are potentially constrained
in market t0, provided that the rank condition is satisfied: this intuitively means that there are
enough goods markets that are unconstrained (
∑
t∈S Jt is suffi ciently large) and that the observable
factors z that explain marginal cost differences are not collinear with the columns of the inverse of
the price derivatives of demand or, equivalently, with the columns of the transpose of the matrix of
cofactors of the price derivatives of demand. In a two-product case, this would mean that observable
factors z are not in the space spanned by the vectors of the absolute values of own- and cross-price
elasticities of the other product7.
Assumption (4) makes use of restrictions on marginal costs across markets. The identification
power in our application will come from the fact that there can be relevant and robust cost re-
strictions across markets and products with constrained and unconstrained prices. As all drugs
in France are potentially price constrained, our identification will come from restrictions on the
marginal costs of the same drug across countries, some regulated (France) and others not price
constrained (the US or Germany). Restrictions across drugs within countries can also be used if
one can identify years and products where prices should not be constrained, as in Lasio (2015), who
exploits the removal from coverage and price regulation that happened in a different drug class in
France.
In Appendix A.2, we provide further details on the empirical estimation counterparts of the
moment condition (5) used for the estimation of parameters λt and thus of the marginal costs.
In our application, we use a log-cost restriction based on drug-specific effects and costs in the US
and Germany. This is justified by the fact that the marginal costs are likely to have some market-
specific component because they include packaging costs and transportation costs for each country.
Denoting in the vector zt the set of all these explanatory variables, we obtain estimates of the
7 In the 2 × 2 matrix case, the vectors z must not be in the space spanned by vectors (q2(1− q2), q1q2)′ and
(q1q2, q1(1− q1))′.
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vector λt as the solution of a non-linear least squares problem:
λt = arg min
λ≥0
∥∥∥[I − zt (z′tzt)−1 z′t] ln(ct (λ,pt,qt))∥∥∥ (6)
Appendix A.2 shows that this problem has a closed-form solution when the cost restriction is in
levels instead of logs.
4 Demand Model
To identify the shape of demand for pharmaceuticals in each market, we estimate a random utility
discrete choice model, which has the advantage of being flexible enough to capture rich substitution
patterns among differentiated products. The model we use explicitly accounts for heterogeneity
in price sensitivity and preferences for certain drug characteristics, as in the study on demand for
pain killers in Sweden by Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016). We assume that demand is static,
hence we are not allowing for consumer learning as in Ching (2010a and 2010b). Although we
think that learning is important when we consider the choice of treatment for individual patients
(Crawford and Shum, 2005), it seems to be much less of a first-order concern when considering
aggregate demand at the year level. Moreover, we believe that the uncertainty over drug quality
for this market in this period is small, as all branded drugs entered before 2003 and the diffusion
of generics was already quite high (different from Ching, 2010a and 2010b). For this reason, we use
a static model and leave for future research a dynamic structural model.
4.1 Random Utility Model
Anti-ulcer drugs can be partitioned into three subclasses, which refer to different generations of
products. Older H2 drugs are still widely used, even if PPI are considered superior products, while
Prostaglandins are mainly prescribed for elderly patients. Differences also exist across molecules
within a subclass. For instance, H2 anti-ulcer drugs are easily substitutable among one another, but
there exist differences between, say, Cimetidine and Ranitidine, as a drug may be more appropriate
to treat one condition or more suitable for one type of patient. Given a molecule, there is also
product differentiation between branded and generic drugs. Even if almost therapeutically equiv-
alent and (nearly) perfect substitutes (other than potential differences in the inert components,
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shape and color of the drug that do not compromise effi cacy or curative effects for most patients),
patients have historically perceived vertical differentiation.
The demand for drugs is driven by the prescription of physicians, the ministry recommendations,
the preferences of patients, and by the role of pharmacists in the substitution towards generics.
Our modeling approach does not disentangle the prescription and purchase process whereby the
patient, the physician, and the pharmacist interact. With aggregate-level data such as those on
sales that we use, we have no ability to identify each actor’s preferences in our demand specification.
This means that the preferences revealed by our demand model have to be interpreted with caution
in terms of welfare. In particular, the price sensitivities may be the result not only of patients’
out-of-pocket costs but also of the incentives for pharmacists and physicians to choose one product
versus another.







jt − β0i pjt1{pjt≤p̄tfrjt } − β
1
i pjt1{pjt>p̄tfrjt }
+ ζjt + εijt (7)
where xkjt are k drug characteristics including detailing ajt, pjt is the price of the drug, p̄
tfr
jt is the
maximum reimbursement price of the drug (coming from the TFR rule), which by convention will
be equal to +∞ for drugs that are not subject to TFR reimbursement rules, ζjt are drug-period-
specific effects, and εijt is consumer i’s deviation from the mean utility of taking drug j in period t.




i are allowed to vary across users i. β
0
i can be interpreted as
the price sensitivity for all drugs not subject to the maximum reimbursement price or with prices
below the maximum reimbursed level p̄tfrjt , while β
1
i is the price sensitivity of drugs subject to the
TFR reimbursement rules when the price is above p̄tfrjt , meaning that the reimbursement rate is
lower for patients who have to pay the difference out of pocket.
The model is completed by the inclusion of an outside good, which corresponds to not taking
any drug or using milder OTC heartburn medications, with a normalized indirect utility ui0t = εi0t.
We assume that each user chooses an element in the choice set {0, 1, .., Jt} according to maximum
utility (7). This modeling of choices can be seen as a reduced form of a more complex mechanism
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by which patients, prescribers and pharmacists interact. It is thus important that the preference
parameters be heterogenous across users i, because of unobserved variation in price-sensitivity that
may be driven by the patient’s choices and their reimbursement scheme; by the prescriber’s choice,
which may follow the insurance system’s recommendation to prescribe cheaper drugs; and by the
pharmacist, who also influences the choice of brand-name versus generic drugs. In particular, in
France, the pharmacist’s margins are regulated such that pharmacists have a preference for generic
drugs. Indeed, pharmacists’margins decrease stepwise in the price of the drug (26.1% of the retail
price if below 22.9€, 10% between 22.9€ and 150€, and 6% above 150€) and are larger in relative
terms for generic than branded drugs (because the absolute margins of generics are equal to those
of the branded drug), which may influence their effort in generic substitution when facing the




i ) across decision makers in this
demand model is thus crucial to capture the aggregate shape of demand resulting from these
heterogeneous situations.























i ) is distributed with p.d.f. ϕ and summarize all the unobserved consumer charac-
teristics, and (σkα, σβ0 , σβ1) characterize how consumer tastes vary according to these unobserved
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Under the assumption that εijt is i.i.d. Gumbel (extreme value type I) distributed, the choice
probability of alternative j by i is







k exp (δkt + µikt)
Then, the market share of product j, sjt, is given by
sjt (xt,pt, ζt) =
∫
sijt (xt,pt, ζt)ϕ (νi) dνi
and own- and cross-price elasticities follow the classical formulas in a random coeffi cient logit.
8 In France, pharmacists are independent and need to pay for their stocks. The regulated margins imply that the
return to their capital stock is higher for generics because the ratio of margin to price of the drug is higher for generics.
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As the data allow us to observe quantities and not market shares, we approximate the aggre-
gate yearly market size denoted by Mt using a fixed coeffi cient logit version of this model with a
non-linear least squares calibration procedure similar to that in Huang and Rojas (2013, 2014).
The method estimates the market size as the solution to the maximization of the fit of the model
that does not specify the outside option but uses market shares relative to one inside good instead.
Despite being based on a “misspecified”model (as it cannot be used in a logit model with random
coeffi cients), we believe that this method provides a good approximation of the market size, which
avoids making more ad hoc assumptions. In a market where total sales grow over time, it is par-
ticularly diffi cult to guess the potential market size, as we do not know if it is stable over time or
grows like total sales or at what rate. The details are provided in Appendix A.3. The market sizes
are such that the outside good’s market share declines from 38% in 2003 to 17% in 2010 and then
remains stable until 2013.
4.2 Identification and Estimation
Identification of this random coeffi cient logit model can be obtained with aggregate data using mo-
ment conditions between constructed demand shock variables ζjt and some instrumental variables
(Berry, 1994; BLP, 1995). As in simple logit demand models, one has to take into account the
problem of endogeneity of prices correlated with unobserved demand factors ζjt. Previous estima-
tion of demand models in pharmaceuticals has used instrumental variables regularly proposed in
empirical IO, such as measures of the degree of competition (Stern, 1996), of costs (Azoulay, 2002),
or prices for different markets or segments (Hausman instrumental variables, used for example in
Azoulay, 2002, and Berndt et al., 2003). Other approaches use the characteristics of competing







where θ = (αk, β0, β1, σkα, σβ0 , σβ1) is the vector of parameters, and wt are instrumental variables,
for example cost shifters as in Nevo (2000). Instruments are crucial for the consistency and robust-
ness of the estimates (Knittel and Metaxoglou, 2014).
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Using data from the hospital segment and from other countries, we define Hausman-style in-
strumental variables to instrument prices in the retail sector. For France, we use prices of anti-ulcer
drugs sold in French and foreign hospitals (Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, and the US). However,
the validity of such instruments relies on the fact that prices across markets are correlated because
of common cost shocks and not because of common unobserved demand shifters (such as changes
in scientific knowledge). Thus, we regress those prices on molecule dummies and country and year
fixed effects and use the residuals as instrumental variables for the price in France. Controlling for
country and time effects, we isolate the quality of each drug proxied by molecule dummies, which is
the part of the price more likely to be correlated with demand unobservables: what remains should
be correlated with the marginal cost of each drug. As additional instruments, meant to control
for transport costs, we use the predictions from a regression of prices on interactions between firm
dummies and exchange rates between $US and, separately, euros, UK pounds and Swiss francs
(which are the currencies of most drug-producing countries). Finally, we include industry price
indices and wages in each country9.
Our demand specification includes detailing expenses at the drug-year level. By doing so, we
need to control for the potential endogeneity of this form of advertising, which is likely to be
positively correlated with the price and may thus lead to biased coeffi cients. The instruments we
use for prices can also be assumed to instrument for detailing expenses, as detailing benefits will
clearly depend on the marginal cost of drugs. However, we also add instruments that should affect
detailing independent of the costs of drugs: we use the average price of detailing per drug and its
square. We obtain this average price using the detailing dataset that reports detailing expenses
and the quantity of detailing “units”measured at the brand level in each country. Detailing units
are defined as a direct contact in promotional activity by the pharmaceutical company with a
physician. The detailing cost corresponds to how much it would cost for a sales representative to
visit a physician (details on these measures are in Section 2.3).
9Data are from the French National Statistical Institute INSEE for France, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
for the US, and Eurostat for Germany. We use the producer price index for all pharmaceuticals and wages in the
manufacturing industry for France, the price index for anti-secretory/antispasmodics and wages in the pharmaceu-
tical manufacturing industry for the US, and the price index for pharmaceutical preparations and wages in the
manufacturing of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations for Germany.
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Following Berry et al. (1999) and Reynaert and Verboven (2014), we use approximations of
optimal instrumental variables (Chamberlain, 1987), which are E[
∂ζjt(θ)
∂θ′
|xt,wt], to improve the effi -
ciency of our estimation. Reynaert and Verboven (2014) show that in the case in which price equals
marginal cost (perfect competition), we can approximate these optimal instrumental variables by
using the predicted price p̂jt from the regression pjt = xjtγx +wjtγw + εjt (where wjt are country-





(approximated by taking derivatives at the mean instead of the mean of derivatives). These
non-linear functions of exogenous variables and cost shifters are only approximations of optimal
instruments in the case of perfect competition but prove to be quite informative even in the case
of imperfect competition (Reynaert and Verboven, 2014).
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Demand Estimation Results
The results of the demand model are reported in Table 410. The variables used in the demand
specification are the brand type (branded or generic), molecule dummies, the number of side effects
and the number of formats. We also include a dummy for each of the main indications of anti-
ulcer drugs: one for the eradication of helicobacter pylori (the major bacterial cause of ulcer),
one for GERD (gastroesophageal reflux disease), and one for co-prescription with non-steroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAID). Interactions between the branded dummy and the number of
formats and the number of side effects are also included. These variables capture the most important
product characteristics that influence demand and are the result of a specification search allowing
for more interactions. We also control for detailing expenses for each drug-market, as previous
research has documented the importance of advertising in affecting demand for pharmaceuticals,
by complementing scientific information (Ching and Ishihara, 2010; Ching, Clark, Horstmann and
Lim, 2016), directing sales towards certain brands (business stealing), or even increasing sales for the
10Coeffi cients are estimated through the simulated method of moments. We use 500 normalized Halton draws for
the simulations used to compute the aggregated market shares. As Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) and Dubé, Fox
and Su (2012) emphasize, we checked the robustness of the estimates across different sets of starting values, tight
convergence criteria, and minimization algorithms. Our estimates are very robust to starting values and simulation
draws once we use the optimal instrumental variables approximation.
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whole market (Leffl er, 1981; Ching and Ishihara, 2012; Anderson, Ciliberto and Lyaukonyte, 2013,
2016; Shapiro, 2018). Detailing was found to be the advertising strategy most effective at increasing
sales (Berndt, Bui, Railey and Urban, 1996; Azoulay, 2002; Berndt et al., 2003; Arcidiacono et al.,
2013, for anti-ulcer drugs) and at decreasing price elasticity (Rizzo, 1999; Donohue and Berndt,
2004).
Our results show that some molecules are preferred over others (as captured by molecule dum-
mies not reported in Table 4 along with year dummies), reflecting perceived quality, which is higher
for PPIs and lower for drugs based on older molecules. Branded drugs are preferred over generics
in all three countries, although the effect is not significant in the US. As expected, in line with
findings in the literature (Berndt et al., 1996, Azoulay, 2002, Berndt et al., 2003, and Arcidiacono
et al., 2013), detailing positively affects demand, although not significantly for the US. Having
an indication for the eradication of helicobacter pylori (the major bacterial cause of ulcer) or for
co-prescription with non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAID) is more valuable (except for
Germany), while being indicated to treat gastroesophageal reflux (GERD) is less. The other mea-
sures of quality, namely the number of available therapeutic forms (formats) and the number of
side effects, have the expected sign when they are significant.
We allow random coeffi cients for the price and for the branded dummy. Consumers are het-
erogeneous in their price sensitivity in the three countries (although the variance estimate is not
very precise in the case of Germany) but less so in their preference for branded drugs, except in
the US where there is substantial and significant heterogeneity. In France, the price sensitivity
is much larger when the price is above the reimbursement price (denoted p̄tfrjt ): in this case, the
out-of-pocket cost of the drug for the patient is increased by the difference between pjt and p̄
tfr
jt ;
thus, it is understandable that patients are much more price sensitive. The heterogeneity in price
sensitivity is however similar across the different reimbursement regimes as suggested by the similar
magnitude of the sigmas associated with the two price coeffi cients.
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Table 4: Estimation Results of Random Coeffi cient Logit Model
Random Coeffi cient Logit France Germany US
mean sigma mean sigma mean sigma
Price -5.50*** 3.00 -4.06*** 2.97**
(1.50) (1.87) (1.36) (1.52)
Price below TFR (pjt × 1{pjt≤p̄tfrjt }) -6.95*** 6.62**
(2.70) (3.25)
Price above TFR (pjt × 1{pjt>p̄tfrjt }) -18.73*** 6.83***
(6.24) (1.38)
Detailing 0.27** 0.17*** 0.05
(0.11) (0.04) (0.14)
Branded 2.44* 1.07 2.81** 0.27 6.31 3.10**
(1.37) (3.17) (1.39) (0.80) (4.91) (1.55)
Nb. formats 0.49* 0.38 1.40***
(0.30) (0.25) (0.55)
Generic*nb. formats 1.90*** 1.48*** 0.02
(0.48) (0.29) (0.99)
Nb. side effects -0.25*** 0.02 -0.39***
(0.07) (0.19) (0.14)
Generic*nb. side effects -0.05 -0.22 0.57
(0.19) (0.19) (0.79)
Helicobacter indication 1.36*** 1.73*** 3.58***
(0.26) (0.42) (0.78)
NSAID indication 0.61** 0.46*** 0.18
(0.29) (0.16) (0.35)
GERD indication -1.44*** -1.52*** -1.58***
(0.35) (0.25) (0.42)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Molecule fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses under each co effi cient. * , **, and *** ind icate sign ificance at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels.
The column “mean” rep orts the m ean of random coeffi cients and the estim ates of fixed co effi cients.
The column “sigma” rep orts the estim ates of the standard deviation of random coeffi cients.
From this estimated demand model, the mean own-price elasticity across products and years
for France is -3.6 and ranges from -13 to -1 across products. Overall, generics show lower own-price
elasticities than branded drugs (-2.9 versus -5.7): this can be interpreted as a consequence of the
incentive for generic substitution for pharmacists as explained before. Indeed, the pharmacists’
margins on each drug are regulated as a percentage of the price of the branded drug, and the
margin is required to be the same in absolute terms for the generic and branded versions. As
a consequence, pharmacists earn a higher ratio of margin to price on generics, and the difference
increases with the price of the drug. This may explain why the own-price elasticity of branded drugs
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can be larger in absolute value than the own-price elasticity of the generic. Table 5 reports own-
and cross-price elasticities for the main drugs in France in 2009. Price elasticity tends to be higher
for drugs subject to the TFR rule with a price above the maximum reimbursement price (Tagamet,
Zantac, and Pepcidine after 2006), which comes from the additional copayments for patients in
this case. Consistent with medical evidence, anti-ulcer drugs are highly differentiated (low cross-
price elasticities) and are mostly substitutable within subclasses (H2, PPI, Prostaglandins). This
is clear from the magnitude of the sales gained by drugs in each class if same-class competitors
raise prices (Zantac-Tagamet, Nexium-Losec-Takepron). PPI branded drugs are those that usually
have the largest cross-price elasticities with other drugs, showing that the branded and even generic
PPI drugs are close substitutes, but they also have quite significant cross-price elasticities with H2
drugs. However, the substitutability relationships go beyond ATC subclass or molecule: patients
are willing to switch to the best-seller Nexium if the price of Zantac increases, instead of buying
the closest alternative, i.e., one of its generics, such as Mylan’s Ranitidine.
Table B1 in the Online Appendix shows that elasticities for higher quality and more recent
branded drugs (in the PPI subclass) tend to decrease gradually over time. Older drugs (H2 and
Prostaglandins) display increasing or fairly stable own-price elasticities.
Table 5: Own- and Cross-Price elasticities for main drugs, 2009 (France)
Branded Generic
Sub-Class H2 H2 PPI PPI PPI Prost. H2 PPI
Company Aptalis Glaxo AstraZ AstraZ Takeda Pfizer Mylan Mylan
Molecule Cimet. Ranit. Omep. Esom. Lanso. Miso. Ranit. Omep.
Drug Name Tagamet Zantac Losec Nexium Takepron Cytotec
Tagamet -6.96 2.84 0.003 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.14
Zantac 0.71 -5.62 0.002 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.13
Losec 0.00 0.00 -5.48 1.64 0.16 0.00 0.003 0.05
Nexium 0.00 0.00 0.19 -3.90 0.25 0.005 0.01 0.14
Takepron 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.73 -5.24 0.01 0.01 0.16
Cytotec 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.81 0.17 -2.45 0.02 0.16
Ranit. Mylan 0.001 0.003 0.02 0.68 0.13 0.01 -3.00 0.23
Omep. Mylan 0.001 0.002 0.04 0.91 0.16 0.01 0.03 -3.68
Notes: Each column is the price elastic ity of demand for the drug in the first row w ith resp ect to the drug named in the first column.
Company names: G laxo is G laxoSm ithK line. A straZ is A straZeneca.
M olecu les: Ranit. is Ranitid ine, Omep. is Omeprazole, E som . is Esom eprazole, Lanso. is Lansoprazole. M iso . is M isoprosto l.
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5.2 Structural Estimation of Margins and Costs
As reported in Table 1, several regulatory rules may have imposed price cuts on both branded and
generic drugs since 2006. Table 1 lists the drugs that were potentially affected by these constraints.
Moreover, even before 2006, prices were subject to regulation, as they were set by the regulator
(CEPS). However, a potential price cap may not be binding, as the counterfactual price decision
of a firm not subject to such a constraint could have led to the same choice. Our identification
method allows us to determine whether constraints are binding. Once demand is estimated, we
use our supply-side model to obtain price-cost margins and marginal costs and test whether price
constraints are actually binding.
Using the structural supply models, we can estimate price-cost margins ignoring price regulation
and assuming that firms can freely set their prices (Section 3.1) and under price-constrained profit
maximization (Section 3.2). We assume that firms’ pricing is not constrained in the US or in
Germany. In France, we allow prices to be possibly constrained at any time, but several regulatory
events likely increased the constraints on the price setting of drugs in certain years. For example,
the anti-ulcer drugs Losec, Lanzor, and Takepron fall under the potential price cut rule after
2006, either because of generic entry in the corresponding subclass (Lansoprazole for Lanzor and
Takepron) or because generics had been on the market for long enough (Omeprazole generics for
Losec). Given these regulatory rules, it is interesting to check whether estimates of constraints show
that the prices of these drugs were indeed more downward constrained after 2006. As explained in
Section 3.2, we assume that the log marginal cost of drugs in France is the sum of a time-invariant
drug effect and a drug-specific additive linear function of the log costs in the US and Germany, plus
an uncorrelated additive deviation. Formally, we implement a non-linear least squares estimator of
λt as shown in equation (6) as






where ωjt (λt) is the residual of the linear regression
ln cjt (λt) = ρj + ρUS ln c
US
jt + ρGR ln c
GR
jt + ωjt (λt) (9)
As our estimation method is a constrained non-linear least squares one, the asymptotic distribution
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of λt is non standard. We use the method of Wang (1996) to compute the asymptotic distribution
and use the asymptotic law of λ to test λjt > 0 for each product11. Table 6 below reports the
constrained non-linear least squares estimates of the λjt parameters for all products j in France
from 2003 to 2013 after normalization by the market size. With some abuse of notation, we replace
qjt − λjt with Mt (sjt − λjt) in equation (2) such that the scale of parameters λjt is the same as
that of market shares sjt. In Table 6, we have the total number of branded and generic products in
France, the corresponding number of products with λjt significantly different from zero and their
mean. The last two columns report the mean and the sum of market shares of products with a
corresponding λjt that is significantly different from zero.
The results show that not all products are significantly constrained by regulation and in par-
ticular that many more products have a significant λjt estimate starting in 2011. There are more
products with a significant λjt in more recent years, and they represent a larger total market share,
due to more generic products having entered the market and potentially because more molecules
became subject to price cuts, following the entry of generics in the PPI subclass. Note that prod-
ucts that have a λjt not significantly different from zero are still directly constrained by regulation
if one product owned by the same firm has a λjt that is significantly positive. Furthermore, even
if none of the λjt values of a firm is significantly different from zero, the prices chosen by this
firm are affected indirectly by the regulatory constraints on other products through the equilibrium
conditions. The magnitude of the λjt estimates is between one-fourth and one-half of the market
share of the corresponding product, suggesting that they should have an economically significant
impact on equilibrium prices. Counterfactuals will confirm that the regulatory constraints on prices
are economically significant.
11Denoting by λ0t the true parameters, Wang (1996) shows that λt − λ0t converges in distribution to the optimal
















s.t. λ− λ0 ≥ 0















We thus use the asymptotic law of λ to test λjt > 0 for each product.
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Table 6: NLLS Estimates of λjt (normalized by market size)
All products Products with λjt significantly positive
Nb. of products Nb. of products λjt sjt
∑
j sjt
Year Branded Generics Branded Generics Mean Mean Mean
2003 12 11 1 5 0.00026 0.00105 0.00628
2004 12 27 1 9 0.00029 0.00183 0.01826
2005 12 28 1 3 0.00027 0.00084 0.00334
2006 12 30 2 5 0.00023 0.01168 0.08176
2007 12 37 3 10 0.00033 0.00904 0.11756
2008 12 36 1 6 0.00030 0.00127 0.00891
2009 12 47 0 11 0.00031 0.00138 0.01519
2010 12 50 1 11 0.00083 0.00318 0.03816
2011 12 62 2 26 0.00152 0.00634 0.17764
2012 12 74 4 36 0.00210 0.00626 0.25034
2013 11 83 3 47 0.00288 0.00858 0.42907
We now turn to the corresponding marginal cost estimates cjt (λt) using equation (2). First,
the linear regression (9) of ln cjt(λ̂t) on the fixed effects ρj , ln c
US
jt and ln c
GR
jt shows that ρUS = 0.05
and ρGR = 0.71 and are both statistically significant at the 1% level, while fixed effects are also
statistically significant, and the R2 of the regression is 0.88.
As a means of comparison, we also estimate the marginal costs denoted cjt (0) that we would
obtain under the assumption that prices are not constrained (Section 3.1). Table 7 reports average
price-cost margins by molecule. It shows the estimated margins ignoring or accounting for price
regulation. The margins are between 9% and 37% for branded drugs and 23% to 47% for generics
when accounting for price regulation. Some generics show much higher margins than their cor-
responding branded versions. This is not surprising: it is common wisdom in the industry that
generic firms display lower marginal costs than branded manufacturers, and this is especially true
for older molecules (Arcidiacono et al., 2013). Markups also vary substantially across molecules.
Examining margins drug by drug also uncovers interesting variation across drugs: the difference is
important for some PPI drugs for the full period, while for others, it is small initially but grows over
time, showing that constraints mattered more over time, and this is consistent with the explicit
price cuts in the period 2006-2012 for these molecules.
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Table 7: Average price-cost margins by molecule (France)
Not accounting for Accounting for
Price Regulation Price Regulation
Sub-Class Molecule All Drugs Branded Generic All Drugs Branded Generic
H2 Cimetidine 52% 15% 62% 41% 14% 47%
Ranitidine 30% 24% 32% 23% 19% 24%
Famotidine 28% 10% 36% 20% 9% 26%
Nizatidine 18% 18% 14% 14%
PPI Omeprazole 29% 22% 30% 22% 14% 23%
Esomeprazole 43% 24% 50% 31% 15% 37%
Lansoprazole 39% 20% 45% 29% 14% 34%
Pantoprazole 43% 20% 47% 33% 14% 36%
Rabeprazole 45% 18% 60% 33% 13% 43%
Prost. Misoprostol 47% 47% 37% 37%
Combi. Bismuth/Antibiotic 27% 27% 21% 21%
Notes: M argins as a p ercentage of price. Empty cells ind icate that there is no generic version of the molecu le nam ed in the corresp onding row .
When not tak ing into account price regu lation , we in fer price cost margins as if firm s were free to choose prices.
Unsurprisingly, the estimates of λjt were often larger and (more) significant in the years when
the price cuts were introduced for each molecule. This translates into larger differences between
constrained and unconstrained margins. This effect persists for certain PPI drugs, while it fades
out for others, meaning that the regulated prices in later years are closer to what the unregulated
prices for these drugs would have been, presumably due to stronger competition from other drugs.
Some significant differences in the markups under the two models shed light on the spillover ef-
fects of regulation on drugs not directly subject to price cuts, showing how the prices chosen by
manufacturers are affected by the regulatory constraints on close PPI substitutes through the equi-
librium conditions. The effect on drugs in the H2 subclass seems to prevail in the beginning of the
period, when Cimetidine and Ranitidine became subject to TFR, which determines the maximum
reimbursement that a patient can obtain. Our demand estimates show that the TFR regulation
affected the shape of demand, and these results suggest that the CEPS may have placed additional
pressure on prices for these drugs when introducing the maximum reimbursement price with the
TFR rule.
Table B2 in Appendix displays the annual averages of the estimated price-cost margins (as a
percentage of price) for the constrained model and the free pricing model. The average price-cost
margin is 6 to 8 percentage points lower when taking into account the price constraints until 2009
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and 10 to 15 percentage points lower from 2010 to 2013. This difference is larger for generics than
for branded drugs. The average margins for branded drugs are smaller as a percentage of the price
than for generics.
These comparisons show how much one would overestimate margins, or underestimate costs, if
not taking into account price constraints. However, they do not show what the counterfactual price
difference would be if there were no pricing regulation. It is certainly possible that margins under
the two models are not estimated to be very different given the observed equilibrium prices, while
the counterfactual free pricing margins would be very different because the prices of substitute
drugs would change. We turn to the counterfactual analysis in the next section.
6 Counterfactuals
In this section, we analyze counterfactual scenarios in which we change the regulatory environment
of drug price setting in France. Holding the shape of demand unchanged, we first study the case
in which drug prices would no longer be constrained by the regulator but freely chosen by firms.
We expect prices to increase, as we found that price constraints are sometimes binding, but the
magnitude of the effect on prices, demand, and expenses is unknown. Then, we investigate another
counterfactual in which the regulator would set price caps through an external reference pricing
policy. In both counterfactuals, not only can we evaluate the changes in prices, demand, and
expenses, but we can also compute the consumer surplus evaluated by the preferences revealed by
our demand model. Of course, as patients’revealed preferences are affected by the health insurance
system, this measured surplus may not represent the true benefit for society, whose willingness to
pay for drugs is mis-measured by the prescriber/patient’s price sensitivity.
To evaluate the variance due to the estimation of demand parameters and marginal costs in
the counterfactuals, we simulate confidence intervals drawing in the distribution of the estimated
demand parameters and then simulate all counterfactuals for each bootstrap sample. This allows
us to construct 95% confidence intervals (which are not always centered around the counterfactual
simulations at the mean parameter estimates).
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6.1 Counterfactuals of Free Pricing in France
Using marginal costs estimated while taking into account constraints on prices, we assess the
impact of the constraints by simulating the counterfactual market equilibrium under free pricing.
Specifically, we estimate the price equilibrium with free pricing for branded drugs and maintain
the current regulatory rules for generics that cap the price of generics as a fixed proportion of
the price of the corresponding branded drug (which, on average across drugs and years, results
in generics having approximately half the price of their branded version)12. We thus solve the






(pjt − cjt) qjt(pt) s.t. pjt ≤ τ b(j)tpb(j)t only if j is a generic
while imposing that prices cannot be smaller than marginal costs (pjt ≥ cjt). Then, the simulated
confidence intervals on the counterfactual results tell us how statistically significant the counterfac-
tual results are compared to the observed values. The results on the confidence intervals on price
changes are reported in Tables B3 and B4 in the Online Appendix.
Our results show that the observed prices for branded drugs under the current regulation tend to
be lower than prices in the counterfactual scenario in which price regulation is removed (percentage
changes are reported in Table B3, where negative numbers mean that observed prices are lower
than counterfactual prices). Observed and counterfactual prices begin to diverge more in the years
when the price cuts were introduced. This is true for all PPI drugs (those directly affected by the
price cuts since 2006), which show fairly close observed and counterfactual prices in the early years
of the sample but larger and significant differences subsequently. For example, the gap is already
significant in 2005 for Losec and tends to increase once its closest PPI competitors also become
subject to the price cuts. A closer examination of the effects by drug shows how some drugs are
almost unaffected, while others are and strongly so, even though they are not directly subject to
the price cuts. The price decline due to regulation for generics (displayed in Table B4) is always
12This percentage evolved over time: until 2005, at entry, the generic price could not exceed 55% of the branded
regulated price. The share was reduced in later years: 50% in 2006, 45% in 2009, and 40% in 2012.
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smaller than for branded drugs, in relative terms and even more in absolute terms, although the
magnitude of the effect is heterogeneous across molecules.
Comparing those counterfactual effects on price with the triple difference effects estimated in
Table 3, we see that the difference-in-difference estimates of price cuts on the prices of drugs in
France would strongly overestimate the impact of this regulation on prices, as we find estimates
of -33% (column 4 of Table 3, coeffi cient of “price cut”*After*France). Evaluating the average
counterfactual price change due to regulation on the set of drugs subject to the “price cut” rule
(Losec, Lanzor, and Takepron since 2006; Nexium since 2008; Pantozol since 2009; and Pariet since
2012), we find instead a 6% lower price due to the price constraints, ranging from a 1% decline in
2006 up to a 17% decline in 2013, when all PPI molecules became subject to the regulation.
The regulatory constraints on prices entail an overall positive albeit relatively modest effect on
quantities consumed (these results are not reported to save space). The effect arises primarily from
an increase in branded drug consumption compared to generic consumption. Price effects are thus
not encouraging generic use (and even reduce it at the end of the period) but are instead increasing
the sales of branded drugs. Price cuts are also steering consumption towards certain drugs. The
higher counterfactual free prices would result in lower sales for most PPI drugs in later years, in
favor of cheaper, older, and less effective H2 drugs. However, the blockbuster Losec, despite a
higher counterfactual price, would benefit from the higher prices of its closest competitors (Nexium
and Takepron) and sell even more than under the regulated lower price. In terms of total expenses,
the price regulation has small effects until 2010, and then leads to a 5 to 6% decrease in 2011 and
2012 and up to 10% in 2013, when the large price-reducing effect of regulatory constraints made it
possible to reduce total expenditures on anti-ulcer drugs.
Hence, while reducing prices on high-quality PPI drugs encourages their consumption at the
expense of older and less-effective H2 drugs, it is doing so at the expense of their generic versions,
which also see their prices reduced but by less in absolute and percentage terms. Generic manu-
facturers are substantially harmed by price cuts, as profits would be 23% higher in a free pricing
scenario, compared to an increase of only 15% for branded firms. The regulation of prices thus
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reduces one layer of differentiation between branded and generic drugs, the difference in price.
Without this wedge, the preference for the branded drugs prevails (as captured by our demand
estimates), and generics lose sales in favor of the now cheaper —yet still more expensive —branded
versions. The mechanism is similar to the segmentation identified in previous research (Frank and
Salkever, 1997; Ching, 2010b), with the price difference between the branded and the generic drug
acting as a differentiation device that regulation reduces.
Table 8 shows the savings due to price regulation compared to the counterfactual situation of free
pricing. Overall, the current regulatory rules generated savings of 150 million dollars for the anti-
ulcer market in France over the period 2003-2013, i.e., approximately 2% of total expenditures for
this market. The savings materialize mostly at the end of the period, driven by lower expenditures
on PPI drugs, which more than compensate for the slightly higher expenses on H2 drugs. Without
additional policy changes in the regulation of prices, the free pricing of drugs would lead to an
increase in drug expenditures. We also find that consumer surplus is higher under the constrained
price equilibrium than under free pricing. Table 8 shows that the increase is 1.1% in 2003, 1.3%
in 2006, 2.6% in 2009 and 10.2% in 2012, primarily and unsurprisingly due to greater utilization
of sometimes cheaper drugs and of branded drugs preferred by consumers. However, these results
must be taken with caution both because of the interpretation of consumer welfare, as measured
by the revealed preferences of our demand models, and because the confidence intervals on overall
consumer surplus are quite wide and, for example, range from 4.2% to 20.4% around the point
estimate of 15.4%.
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Table 8: Counterfactual Savings and Surplus from Free Pricing
2003 2006 2009 2012 2003-2013
Sub-Class Molecule
H2 Cimetidine -913 -239 -28 -83 -2,120
Ranitidine -894 -578 -384 1133 -4,007
Famotidine -37 8 18 42 134
Nizatidine -4 1 3 6 5
PPI Omeprazole -469 1,916 2,111 13,091 59,149
Lansoprazole 666 616 -468 3,853 9,973
Pantoprazole 82 333 1,710 1,203 17,495
Esomeprazole 1,672 -1,067 1,095 4,488 44,213
Rabeprazole 407 389 -832 28,273 27,918
Prost. Misoprostol -277 -239 -181 -145 -2,375
Combi. Bismuth/Antibiotic 53
Total 234 1,140 3,044 51,860 150,439
Sub-total Branded 382 1,903 4,107 30,389 88,242
Generics -148 -763 -1,064 21,471 62,197
Consumer Surplus Change +1.1% +1.3% +2.6% +10.2% +15.4%
Notes: Savings are in 1,000 $US. Negative numbers indicate increased expenditures compared to
observed. Surplus change is as a percentage of the surplus under the current regulation.
It is interesting to compare the previous results to those from a fully free pricing equilibrium, in
which generics are no longer subject to a cap on their price in the form of a percentage of the branded
price (not reported). As expected, all generics increase their prices in this counterfactual scenario.
More interesting, branded manufacturers respond by setting prices only slightly higher than those
observed under the current price regulation. This branded behavior reflects a relatively lower and
highly heterogeneous brand preference in France than in other countries, presumably driven by
the strong incentives for pharmacists to substitute branded drugs with generics despite the likely
preference of patients for branded drugs. As a consequence of the smaller price difference between
the branded and the generic, demand shifts from generic to branded drugs, while the aggregate
effects on expenditures are similar to those obtained under the cap on generics. Ultimately, allowing
generics to freely set their prices seems to lead to a larger shift in sales to branded drugs.
6.2 Counterfactuals of External Reference Pricing in France
External reference pricing was introduced in France in 2004 as one criterion used by the CEPS in
setting the price of new drugs. It only applies to drugs that entered the French market after this
date and to none in the anti-ulcer market until 2013. The rationale behind this policy is to reward
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innovative drugs (i.e., those with a significant therapeutic improvement, measured by ASMR values
of 1, 2 or 3 on a 1-5 scale) by guaranteeing a 5-year price at the same level as observed in other
European countries. In specific, the price of innovative drugs cannot be lower than the lowest
price observed in the reference countries, which are Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. For non-
innovative drugs (i.e., with ASMR values of 4 or 5), the goal in price setting is to generate savings
vis à vis an existing comparator drug. For these drugs, external reference pricing may also be used
by the CEPS, as long as it is able to restrict prices.
We thus perform counterfactual simulations with an explicit cap on prices p̄refjt for drug j in
year t that is defined as the lowest price among the prices in year t− 1 in France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the UK (provided that it is above the marginal cost). For the two innovative drugs in
our sample, Losec and Nexium (ASMR values of 2 and 3), the cap is the average price across the
four reference countries in 2003 for the years 2004-2008 and in 2008 for the years 2009-2013. This
definition of external reference prices implies that observed prices tend to be, on average, higher
than these hypothetical external reference prices from 2003 to 2005 but lower after 2006, which
is when the French regulator introduced price cut rules. For generics, we maintain the current
regulation that caps their price as a percentage of the branded drug (as described in Section 6.1).







(pjt − cjt) qjt(pt)
s.t. pjt ≤ p̄refjt if j is a branded drug (Reference Pricing)
pjt ≤ τ b(j)tpb(j)t if j is a generic
We also require all prices to exceed marginal costs (pjt ≥ cjt), and we solve for the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium.
Tables B5 and B6 in the Online Appendix report the confidence intervals on price changes from
the current observed prices to the equilibrium prices under the external reference pricing caps, as a
percentage of counterfactual prices. Overall, the counterfactual prices under the external reference
pricing rule are lower (and in some years significantly so) than the observed prices under the current
41
regulation. Hence, despite the introduction of price cuts in France, which lower prices with respect
to a free pricing scenario, external reference prices as defined above would further reduce prices.
However, the differences across drugs are substantial. Old H2 and Prostaglandin drugs, which
enjoy lower prices in the reference countries, would be forced to set a lower price in all years. Of
the innovative drugs, only Nexium (with a price cap significantly higher than the observed price),
would set a consistently higher price than the observed one (but usually lower than the reference
cap) except in 2013; the difference for Losec is less sizable. Other PPI drugs would benefit from the
higher prices for the two closest competitors, also being able to increase their prices, although not
always. The downward effect on the prices of generic drugs under this counterfactual regulation
(reported in Table B6) is consistent across all molecules and years and often very strong, with
observed prices sometimes being more than twice the counterfactual prices. Demand would on
average increase, driven by higher sales of now much cheaper H2 drugs at the expense of more
innovative and more effective PPI drugs, with only Nexium and Losec limiting their losses despite
their higher prices thanks to their recognized superior quality. Unsurprisingly, given their much
lower price, the big winners from external reference pricing are generics, the sales of which increase
significantly. Then, despite the much lower price level, on average, expenditures under external
reference pricing regulation would not differ substantially from those observed under the current
regulatory rules in the early years, as reported in Table 9: the increased demand would slightly
outweigh the effect of lower prices until 2009. After 2009, however, external reference pricing
would lead to savings, with total expenditures declining by up to 50% at the end of the period.
Moreover, in this counterfactual scenario, expenditures on generics are higher, except in 2012-2013,
when demand increases but the price is so low that it generates savings relative to current price
regulation. As a result, Table 9 shows that the counterfactual consumer surplus would be much
larger than the observed one (+39% with confidence interval [+37%,+47%]) and would increase
over time.
These counterfactual simulations suggest that different regulatory rules may lead to different
equilibrium levels of demand and prices but that they may also determine winners and losers.
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Branded PPI drugs, which can generally set a higher price, sell less, to the benefit of H2 drugs and
to their generics, when they become available. Thus, this rule seems to encourage generic sales,
but it imposes strong pressure on their margins (for some, the price is estimated to decrease to the
marginal cost). Therefore, it would fulfill one of the objectives of the French regulator, to increase
generic penetration, but it is unclear what the long-run effects might be if generics were priced at
the level of marginal costs. To assess these long-run effects on the entry and exit of drugs, however,
we would need a dynamic model, something which is outside the scope of our paper.
Table 9: Counterfactual Savings and Surplus with External Reference Caps
2004 2006 2009 2012 2004-2013
Sub-Class Molecule
H2 Cimetidine -608 -365 -103 675 -652
Ranitidine -339 -1,323 -951 4,534 2,525
Famotidine 83 -114 -78 95 -61
Nizatidine -4 -15 21 31 38
Sub-total H2
PPI Omeprazole -6,241 -17,175 -6,751 43,880 34,593
Lansoprazole -292 4,997 -2,596 25,622 81,427
Pantoprazole 4,985 8,565 4,663 20,743 109,294
Esomeprazole 1,210 851 5,180 9,162 68,689
Rabeprazole 1,531 4,340 3,995 21,829 99,573
Sub-total PPI
Prost. Misoprostol 45 -363 -153 637 -113
Combi. Bismuth/Antibiotic 382
Total 371 -601 3,226 127,209 395,695
Sub-total Branded 7,594 20,025 24,687 27,216 267,745
Generics -7,222 -20,626 -21,462 99,993 127,950
Consumer Surplus Change +6% +9% +24% +30% +39%
Notes: Savings are in 1,000 $US. Negative numbers indicate increased expenditures relative to observed.
Surplus change is as a percentage of the counterfactual estimated surplus.
We also simulate the counterfactual in which generics are also subject to external reference
pricing, with caps based on generic prices in other countries. Our simulations suggest that this rule
would lead to generic prices very close to and sometimes higher than the observed values. Branded
prices would be similar to those estimated in the previous counterfactual, except for a downward
pressure that these more expensive generics seem to be placing on some PPI branded drugs at
their entry on the market. Thus, in this scenario, generics would enjoy a larger markup but to the
detriment of their sales. However, the effect does not seem to simply be a transfer from generics
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to branded, as total demand declines, expenditures increase, and consumer surplus is estimated to
be lower than the observed value, especially later in the period.
7 Conclusion
We develop a structural model of demand and supply to study the impact of the price regulation of
anti-ulcer drugs in France. Using IMS Health data on retail sales of anti-ulcer drugs for the period
2003-2013, we first estimate demand for France, the US and Germany, using a flexible model that
accommodates the consumer heterogeneity prevalent in this market. The results confirm that anti-
ulcer drugs are strongly differentiated and that consumers are highly heterogeneous in their price
sensitivity. Consistent with the previous literature, brand-name drugs are preferred to their generic
versions, and detailing increases demand. We use these demand estimates to investigate the effect
of price regulations on firms’pricing behavior. We model the pricing decisions of firms as being
potentially constrained by these regulatory rules in the form of price caps. Identification relies on
observing the same products in a regulated market (France) and in markets under free pricing (the
US and Germany) and uses cost restrictions for the same drugs across markets. The results show
that not all products are significantly constrained by regulation and that, unsurprisingly, this is
more common in the years when the French regulator (CEPS) introduced price cuts for branded
drugs based on the availability of generics, which directly affected six anti-ulcer drugs in our sample
after 2006.
To quantify the effects of regulation, we perform a counterfactual simulation of the equilibrium
without any price regulation for branded drugs, with generics still subject to the cap based on the
price of their branded versions. We find that recent regulation was effective in reducing prices,
especially for high-quality drugs, and this encouraged their consumption. However, it did so at the
expense of their generic versions, which also experienced a decline in price but one that is lower
in both absolute and percentage terms. With a smaller wedge between the branded and generic
prices, the preference for the branded drugs captured by our demand estimates shifts demand from
generics to the now cheaper — yet still more expensive — branded versions. Nevertheless, price
constraints generate some modest savings, on average 2% of total expenses for the full 11-year
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period. Counterfactuals also show that consumer surplus increases thanks to regulation, due to
greater utilization of cheaper and preferred branded drugs.
We simulate a second counterfactual equilibrium under an external reference pricing policy
(similar to that introduced in France but never used for the drugs in our sample), which caps the
price in France with a reference depending on the price of the same drug in Italy, Germany, the
UK and Spain. We find that prices would decline even more and demand would increase but less
than proportionally, leading to additional savings. Furthermore, generic penetration would increase
(one of the objectives of the French regulator), driven by very small generic margins. While this
short-run effect would increase consumer surplus, it is unclear what the long run effects on the
entry and exit of generics could be.
Our work demonstrates the importance of accounting for regulation in estimating market power
or welfare and raises concerns about the ability of regulators to predict ex ante the equilibrium
effects generated by different regulatory rules. While we believe that this may be a general message
and not something that is induced by the specific setting that we study, we are aware of some
limitations of our work. For example, the results produced by our static model do not take into
account dynamics in demand, such as learning effects, or dynamics in supply, and only provide
a short-term evaluation of the effects of the policy. An evaluation of the long-run effects of a
regulation should take into account its effects on research and development and the entry of drugs,
both branded and generic, topics that we leave for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition
With assumptions (3) and (4), ct is identified using price-cost margins solutions (1) in all uncon-
strained markets S. Then, using (2) and




ct − ct0 = pt − pt0 +Qp (pt)
−1 qt −Qp(pt0)−1qt0 +Qp(pt0)−1λt0
= (zt − zt0)








−1λt0 − (zt − zt0)
′ δ
using (4), the true λt0 should satisfy the moment condition for all t ∈ S
E (ωt (δ,λt0)) = 0










′ , Q−1p (pt0)
]
has
full rank Jt0 +dim(δ). As Jt is the number of goods in market t, and the expectation of the moment
condition is over goods and markets t ∈ S, we also need that Jt0 + dim(δ) ≤
∑
t∈S Jt which will be
often the case.
A.2 Estimation of Constrained Marginal Costs
Given the demand estimates that determine the demand shape Qp (pt), given a vector λt, the
marginal cost vector is
ct (λt,pt,qt) = pt +A (pt) (qt − λt)





−1 is composed of block of the inverse demand derivatives by firm
Qfp (pt) (Q
f
p (pt) is the matrix on demand derivatives Qp (pt) where all rows and columns not
corresponding to firm f products are replaced by zeros). Remark that the cost vector ct (λt,pt,qt)
implicitly depends on demand estimates through the estimated A (pt).
We impose a cost restriction that can be written with a given vector of observable variables zt,
wit a known transformation f(.), as
f(ct (λt,pt,qt)) = ztγ + ωt
with
E [ωt|zt] = 0
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We thus look for (λt, γ) that satisfy this moment condition whose empirical counterpart leads us




using the usual L2 norm, which leads to the following solution
λt = arg min
λ
∥∥∥[I − zt (z′tzt)−1 z′t] f(ct (λ,pt,qt))∥∥∥
where we replaced γ by the OLS estimates of the projection of f(ct (λt,pt,qt)) on zt. λt will be
the solution of the same problem with a minimization over λ ≥ 0 if the constraint is known to be
of the form pjt ≤ pjt.
In the particular case where f(.) is the identity, we obtain a closed form solution for λt as is
shown below.
As the residual ωt of the orthogonal projection of ct on zt is


























= ω̃t (pt, zt,qt)−B (pt, zt)λt
where ω̃t is the residual of the orthogonal projection of (pt +A (pt)qt) on zt and B (pt, zt) the
residual of the orthogonal projection of A (pt) on zt:























whose first order condition leads to
−ω̃′t (pt, zt,qt)B (pt, zt) + λ′tB (pt, zt)
′B (pt, zt) = 0








t ω̃ (pt, zt,qt)
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which exists and is unique if B (pt, zt)
′B (pt, zt) is invertible. λt is thus the OLS coeffi cient of the
projection of ω̃ (pt, zt,qt) on B (pt, zt).
Remark also that if the price constraint is known to be a price ceiling as pjt ≤ pjt then we know
that λjt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint and should be non negative. In
this case λt = arg min
λ≥0
∥∥∥[I − zt (z′tzt)−1 z′t] f(ct (λ,pt,qt))∥∥∥ which has also a closed form solution








t ω̃ (pt, zt,qt)
]
+
where [.]+ means that each non positive element of the vector is replaced by zero.
A.3 Market Size Approximation
In our demand model we normalize the utility of the outside good and model the aggregate market
share of each drug as a function of different characteristics. As usual, one needs to take a stand on
the potential market size, in order to use observed sales quantities qjt and market sizeMt to obtain
measures of market shares as sjt = qjt/Mt. As the market size is not observed and we do not have
an obvious definition of the potential market for antiulcer drugs, we approximate market size per
year using the insights of Huang and Rojas (2013, 2014) in the simple case of the fixed coeffi cient
logit version of our model. In the logit case, we can simply use the market share equations of the
logit to obtain, by difference between two goods j and j′,
ln qjt − ln qj′t =
∑
k
αk(xkjt − xkj′t)− β(pjt − pj′t) + ζjt − ζj′t
which does not depend on any market size assumption and allows to identify αk, β, by two stage















where α̂k (Mt) and β̂ (Mt) are the 2SLS coeffi cient estimates of the following equation






αkxkjt + βpjt + ζjt
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A.4 Additional Tables
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics on Promotional Expenses per Year (France)
Promotional Activity Sales
Detailing Other Total Total Mean Number
Country Drugs Expenses Expenses Std Units Revenue of Molecules
France Generics 23 30 661,180 261,695 7.7
Branded 78,650 88,735 468,729 510,157 11.5
Germany Generics 30,787 33,127 1,183,946 451,724 10.7
Branded 75,382 77,203 228,744 258,760 15.1
US Generics 58 742 872,036 297,256 12.0
Branded 572,960 933,106 665,647 2,166,961 16.0
Notes: All expenses are in 1,000 $US per year. Other expenses include meetings, journal advertising,
clinical trials, mails. Direct To Consumer Advertising is forbidden in France.
Table A2: Summary Statistics for the US
Number of drugs Quantity Market Share Price Revenue
Year All Branded Generics (1,000 std units) Branded Generics ($US/std unit) (1,000 $US)
2003 66 15 51 2 025 452 67% 33% 0.88 4 034 679
2004 70 17 53 1 875 573 64% 36% 1.10 4 091 029
2005 71 17 54 1 795 266 63% 33% 1.14 4 113 685
2006 72 16 56 1 894 541 62% 38% 0.97 4 329 421
2007 73 17 56 1 925 183 59% 41% 1.08 4 437 844
2008 76 16 60 1 845 887 51% 49% 1.01 4 264 548
2009 84 17 67 1 919 050 45% 55% 1.12 4 116 476
2010 88 16 72 1 956 464 35% 65% 1.40 3 841 758
2011 95 16 79 2 013 497 29% 71% 1.31 3 414 379
2012 100 17 83 1 788 713 28% 72% 1.34 3 111 634
2013 112 16 96 1 757 347 25% 75% 1.67 3 014 056
Notes: Price is the average price per standard unit in $US across all drugs. Revenue is total revenue of the class.
Table A3: Summary Statistics for Germany
Number of drugs Quantity Market Share Price Revenue
Year All Branded Generics (1,000 std units) Branded Generics ($US/std unit) (1,000 $US)
2003 90 18 72 922 774 40% 60% 1.63 1 024 096
2004 83 15 68 963 578 44% 56% 1.75 1 153 481
2005 90 15 75 1 118 165 49% 51% 1.65 1 225 519
2006 92 15 77 1 222 855 43% 57% 1.56 1 087 547
2007 86 15 71 1 413 689 32% 68% 1.56 1 040 938
2008 90 13 77 1 611 532 29% 71% 1.49 1 079 989
2009 113 12 101 1 791 422 17% 83% 1.25 953 712
2010 116 12 104 1 979 180 10% 90% 1.26 800 048
2011 109 13 96 2 176 575 5% 95% 2.02 662 924
2012 111 13 98 2 377 741 4% 96% 1.97 643 147
2013 106 13 93 2 541 186 3% 97% 2.01 591 608
Notes: Price is the average price per standard unit in $US across all drugs. Revenue is total revenue of the class.
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B ONLINE APPENDIX
B.1 Additional Tables on Estimated Margins
Table B1: Own-Price elasticities of main branded drugs (France)
Drug Subclass 2003 2006 2009 2012
Losec PPI -5.97 -7.86 -5.48 -6.86
Nexium PPI -10.94 -6.40 -3.90 -4.66
Lanzor PPI -7.78 -6.51 -5.47 -4.85
Takepron PPI -7.83 -6.47 -5.25 -4.02
Pantozol PPI -7.56 -5.41 -4.91 -5.05
Pariet PPI -7.89 -6.05 -4.94 -4.63
Tagamet H2 -2.74 -7.19 -6.97 -8.88
Zantac H2 -4.88 -6.76 -5.63 -7.56
Pepcidine H2 -6.27 -12.81 -12.94 -15.87
Cytotec Prost. -2.10 -1.98 -2.45 -2.09
Notes: PPI: Proton Pump Inhib itors. H2: H2 receptor antagon ist. P rost.: P rostagland ins.
Table B2: Average price-cost margins by year (France)
Not accounting for Accounting for
Year Price Regulation Price Regulation
All Drugs Branded Generic All Drugs Branded Generic
2003 27% 21% 33% 21% 16% 26%
2004 28% 23% 30% 20% 16% 21%
2005 27% 23% 28% 20% 16% 22%
2006 30% 21% 33% 22% 15% 24%
2007 27% 21% 28% 21% 16% 23%
2008 29% 20% 32% 23% 15% 26%
2009 31% 22% 33% 24% 16% 26%
2010 38% 20% 42% 28% 15% 31%
2011 40% 22% 43% 30% 16% 33%
2012 44% 21% 47% 33% 17% 35%
2013 53% 29% 56% 38% 21% 40%
Notes: W hen not tak ing into account price regu lation , we in fer price cost margins as if firm s
were free to choose price. M argins as a p ercentage of price.
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